Research Article
A Study on the Effects of Controlling Shareholders’ Ownership and the Sensitivity between Controlling Shareholders’ Wealth and Firms’ Performance on the Risk and Tobin’s Q of Firms
Dong-A University
Published: January 2015 · Vol. 44, No. 1 · pp. 81-102
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Abstract
This study analyzes, for business groups, the effects of controlling shareholders’ ownership onthe level of risk-taking (averseness), R&D investment, and the Tobin’s Q. This study alsoanalyzes the effects of the sensitivity between controlling shareholders’ wealth and firms’performance on them. For that, this study set two compelling hypotheses: the interest alignment hypothesis andthe conservatism hypothesis. If the former proves true, then the level of risk-taking, R&Dinvestment, and the Tobin’s Q increase with the higher controlling shareholders’ ownership andthe higher sensitivity between controlling shareholders’ wealth and firms’ performance. Incontrast, if the latter proves true, then the empirical results will be the opposite. From the empirical evidence, this paper proves that the conservatism hypothesis be true. Indetail, the z-score increases and the unsystematic risk, the systematic risk, and the operatingrisk, R&D investment, and the Tobin’s Q decreases with the higher controlling shareholders’ownership and the higher sensitivity between controlling shareholders’ wealth and firms’performance. These results show that the conservatism hypothesis proves true.
