The cross-network externalities of sharing economy platforms create a risk of monopoly transfers through tying. Accordingly, this study analyzes the form of transfers of monopolistic power through tying in the sharing economy and presents policy suggestions. This study extends the Hotelling model to analyze the market for a sharing economy platform and provides a model that reflects the matching probability under the assumption that matching between consumers and suppliers is important in the sharing economy. The analysis shows that if consumers’ transportation costs for each platform are small, the monopolistic transfer phenomenon occurs, in which a platform with a large number of initial subscribers monopolizes the market, but if transportation costs are large enough, such a monopoly transfer does not occur. If the overall market has a greater preference for a particular platform, the initial number of subscribers that causes the monopoly transfer varies. Thus, regulatory criteria should be applied differently depending on transportation costs and preference. Regulations on sharing economy platforms should be approached with expertise under the new market conditions of the fourth industrial revolution as well as with traditional classical industrial organizational theory. Using the joint regulation method, this study suggests a direction in which subjects can help expand their expertise to the establishment of a regulatory system within the scope established by the government.