This paper examines the effect of real earnings management on firm-specific stock price crash risk. Managers have an incentive to hide firm-specific negative information using earnings management. When the accumulation of the negative information reaches the limit that the managers are willing to hide, the hidden information burst out as a bad news to the public at once leading to a stock price crash. Prior U.S. studies report that managers tend to use more real earnings management than accrual based earnings management(Bruns and Merchant, 1990; Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2005; Cohen, Dey, and Lys, 2008). In this circumstance, real earnings management can be a tool of managers to veil firm-specific negative information. We consider that real earnings management increases firm-specific stock price crash risk, and for that reason we attempt to investigate the link between managers’ real earnings management activities and subsequent stock price crash risk. We collect 12,991 firm-year observations listed on Korean market from 2002 to 2014, and we use the measures of real earnings management from Cohen and Zarowin(2010) and the measures of firm-specific stock price crash risk from Callen and Fang(2013 & 2015) to examine the association between managers’ real earnings management activities and subsequent stock price crash risk. From our empirical results, we find that firms have more possibility to experience a subsequent stock crash as their managers’ real earnings management activities increases. However the positive association between real earnings management and stock price crash risk is weakened when firm’s information environment level or corporate governance level is high. The result implies that good information environment and corporate governable can help to reduce subsequent stock price crash risk caused by managers’ real earnings management activities. This study will contributes to academic and disclosure-related practitioners by reporting real earnings management makes an influence to firm-specific stock price crash risk in Korean capital market. Additionally, we believe that the empirical results may shed some light on the understanding of the significance of information environment and corporate governance as a tool of monitoring managers’ opportunistic activities.