Research Article
The Effect of Corporate Tax Aggressiveness on Accruals Quality: Focused on the Innate and Discretionary Components of Accruals Quality
Chungbuk National University
Korea University
Korea University
Published: January 2017 · Vol. 46, No. 3 · pp. 715-753
DOI: https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.17287/kmr.2017.46.3.715
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Abstract
This study empirically examines the effect of corporate tax aggressiveness on information risk proxied by accruals quality. Also, this study distinguishes accruals quality driven by economic fundamentals (innate AQ) versus management discretion (discretionary AQ) following Francis et al.(2005) and investigates whether corporate tax aggressiveness affect accruals quality differently depending on the source of accruals quality. In the additional analysis, we partition the sample into Chaebol versus non-Chaebol firms and test whether the relation between corporate tax aggressiveness and accruals quality is different for Chaebol vs. non-Chaebol firms. Further, we test whether the relation between corporate tax aggressiveness and accruals quality has changed since the adoption of IFRS. We measure tax aggressiveness using GAAP ETR and CASH ETR introduced by Dyreng et al.(2008) and classify firms as tax aggressive if they are in the lowest quintile of GAAP ETR or CASH ETR by year within the same industry following Donohoe and Knechel(2014). Our sample covers listed firms in Korea in non-financial industries with fiscal year-end in December from 2007 to 2014. Earlier studies view corporate tax aggressiveness as increasing firm value since aggressive tax strategy saves tax payments and cash outflows. In contrast, recent papers focus on agency problem related with tax avoidance activities. For example, aggressive tax positions can decrease firm value by increasing potential tax and nontax costs. Such costs include firm’s reputation penalty and can be considerably large in cases where aggressive tax positions are successfully challenged by tax authorities(Slemrod, 2004). Additionally, managers may engage in tax aggressive activities to extract private benefits rather than to increase firm value. In such cases, aggressive tax positions may increase information asymmetry because opportunistic managers have incentive to engage in complicated transactions and obscure reporting to muddy their opportunistic behaviors(Balakrishnan et al., 2012; Donohoe and Knechel, 2014). Consistently, recent studies argue that corporate tax avoidance activities exacerbate information asymmetry and impair quality of financial reporting and disclosures(Balakrishnan et al., 2012; Park, 2012; Kang and Ko, 2014). We document several findings. First, we find that firms classified as tax aggressive are more likely to report low quality accruals, suggesting that tax aggressive firms produce low quality financial reports with high information risk. When we disaggregate accruals quality into innate versus discretionary component, corporate tax aggressiveness does not affect discretionary accruals quality while it significantly impairs innate portion, implying that tax aggressiveness is mostly related with information risk driven by firm fundamentals. Such result remains valid when we measure tax aggressiveness as continuous value of ETR instead of dichotomous variable. Second, when we classify sample into Chaebol versus non-Chaebol firms, tax aggressiveness impairs accruals quality for non-Chaebol firms while tax aggressiveness is positively related with accruals quality for Chaebol firms. Third, when we partition the sample into pre- versus post-IFRS period, we find that the negative relation between tax aggressiveness and accruals quality is attenuated since the adoption of IFRS. The result suggests that the adoption of IFRS improves information environment in general(e.g. Byard et al., 2011; Cotter et al., 2012; Horton et al., 2013; Nam, 2015 etc) and lowers information risk proxied by accruals quality. This study contributes to the literature examining corporate tax aggressive activities. Prior research in this area investigates corporate tax aggressiveness’ relation with firm value(Desai and Dharmapala, 2009; Ko, 2007; Ki, 2012; Kang and Ko, 2014; Yoon, 2015; Ki and Lee, 2015), stock returns(Hanlon and Slemrod, 2009; Kim et al., 2011; Choi and Kim, 2015), cost of debt(Kim and Cho, 2012), audit fees(Donohoe and Knechel, 2014), audit hours(Park and Chee, 2016b), analyst’ earnings forecast errors(Balakrishnan et al., 2012), and credit ratings (Park and Chee, 2016a). Our study is different in that we examine direct relation between tax aggressiveness and information risk measured as accruals quality. This research provides implications to academicians, practitioners, and regulators since this is the first study documenting that corporate tax aggressiveness amplifies information risk proxied by accruals quality using Korean data.
