This paper examines whether the National Pension Service of Korea (the NPS), the largest institutional investor, is fulfilling its fiduciary responsibility by investigating cases in which the NPS has cast votes against resolutions in the shareholders' meetings. Since the Korea Stewardship Code, 「Principles on the Fiduciary Responsibilities of Institutional Investors」 was introduced in 2016, we find that the NPS has been more likely to vote against firms that have weak corporate governance, that hire non-big auditors, or in which the largest shareholder’s ownership is high. However, the “dissent” voting has not been generally accompanied by a subsequent reduction in the ownership interest of the NPS when we control for the stock performance, audit quality, and the largest shareholder’s ownership interest. That is, the NPS did not engage in real actions other than exercising voting rights against firms even after the Korea Stewardship Code was introduced. We provide implications for the NPS to fulfill the stewardship responsibilities and achieve other strategic goals including the enhancement of corporate governance.