The literature on agency theory suggests that linking executive compensation to corporate performance is a way of alleviating the agent problem. Therefore, previous research confirmed a positive relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance. In the research on Korea, however, the analysis was conducted by using the average compensation rather than using executives individual compensations due to a limitation of the data. This is because before the amendment of the Capital Market and Financial Investment Business Act in 2013, only the total amount of the executives’ compensation was disclosed. However, the individual compensation of executives whose total compensation is more than KRW 500 million is provided by the company from 2013. The purpose of this paper is to re-examine the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance, using data of individual compensation of executives for listed companies. In addition, classify executives according to their positions and ownership, and analyze the relationship between the compensation of each classification executives and corporate performance. The results of this paper are as follows. First, in the total sample, both stock returns and sales growth rate have a positive relationship between the executive's compensation. However, unlike previous studies, there was no relationship between change in Return on Equity(ROE) or change in Return on Asset(ROA), which are profitability indicators of a company, and executive's compensation. Second the compensation of all executives group, except non-owner executive, is affected by sales growth rate. And these impact of sales growth rate on owner-executive disappeared as the ownership percentage increase. However, the compensation of non-owner executive showed a negative relationship with ROA. This is not only contradictory to previous research but also contrary to common sense. Overall, sales growth rate is highly related to executives‘ compensation, while ROA and ROE are not related to executive's compensation. That is, sales is a major incentive to executive’s compensation in Korean listed companies. But the increase of company‘s sales does not mean the profit will increase. Therefore, it will potentially lead executive to increase their size or achieve short-term performance, which is more than just quality. It ultimately affects the sustainable development of enterprises and the maximization of corporate value. These results imply that there is a need to strengthen the governance structures and executive compensation system and monitor the management activities of executives in Korean listed companies.