This study examines the relation between nonaudit services and audit quality, focusing on audit engagement profitability, under certain circumstances, that could affect this relation. Early research on the relation between nonaudit services and audit quality provides mixed evidence. However, the majority of studies also suggest that future research should take into account particular circumstances where auditor’s economic bonding do dominate. We extend this stream of study by examining the relation between nonaudit services and audit quality in particular settings with more or less profitable engagement. We use discretionary accruals as a proxy for audit quality, using a cross-sectional performancecontrolled Jones(1991)model and cross-sectional modified-Jones model. And we choose the audit fee per hour and abnormal audit fee as proxy for audit engagement profitability, We find that nonaudit services are positively associated with nonaudit services suggesting that nonaudit services adversely affect audit quality. We also find less profitable engagement moderate the relation between nonaudit services and audit quality. Our results continue to support the hypothesis for both proxies for audit engagement profitability, Our findings provide important contribution to auditor-provided nonaudit services literature by showing that audit engagement with low profitability are less likely to allow intensified economic bonding from nonaudit services for auditor’s risk-management. Our research also extends prior researches that emphasize the need to consider certain circumstances including institutional settings and incentives that influence decision making in the view that nonaudit services will always not adversely affect audit quality.